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Abstract
In this article we argue that changes in political structures in post-Soviet Ukraine impacted the 
potential for conflict during transition. Relying on organisational theory to determine the 
conflict potential in Ukraine, we argue that this conflict is structurally determined by the 
changing character of relations within and beyond Ukraine. The potential for conflict was 
always present in post-Soviet Ukraine, but this article examines the facts of when, how, and 
why conflict happened, and how it was related to weak state institutions, centre-periphery 
relations, and an unsettled relationship with Russia. Relying on our analytical framework, we 
conclude that the conditions for further conflict greatly outweigh the conditions for peace.
Introduction
The challenges Ukraine has faced since independence are many. It has set out to be both 
Western and Eastern, often, as Taras Kuzio (2003) has shown, vacillating between East and 
West in foreign policy and foreign relations while maintaining complex, fraught relationships 
with both. Like many former Soviet countries, it has struggled through political, economic, 
and even social transition (G. Smith 1999) and found ways to manage all these challenges, 
even arriving at what appeared to be a tenuous status quo (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2013). 
Nevertheless, by 2014 Ukraine was at war against what it called ‘Russian-backed terrorists’ 
and launching an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) that would challenge the country. The 
potential for conflict was always present in post-Soviet Ukraine. This article is about the facts 
of when, how, and why it occurred. 
Ukraine has faced many challenges, but the current ethnolinguistic character of the war is not 
among them, even though the Russian government and media present the war as protecting 
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the rights of Russians in the ‘near abroad’ and the Ukrainian government has increasingly 
framed the conflict in ethnolinguistic terms. What then are the drivers of conflict in Ukraine, 
and what do they tell us about the conflict potential in transitioning states? Our exploration of 
conflict potentials in Ukraine relies on organisational theory to argue that conflict is 
structurally determined by the changing character of relations within and beyond Ukraine. It 
will focus on weak state institutions, centre-periphery relations, and an unsettled relationship 
with Russia.
Our analytical framework derives from organisational theory in management studies. It offers 
a way to think about conflict potential without having to assume the presence of prior existing 
social cleavages like those in the ethnic conflict literature (see further on). We can recognise 
Ukraine’s ethnic and linguistic diversity, and even see that at times this diversity was 
politicised. This does not, however, provide sufficient grounds to assume conflict potential. 
Relying on the work of Stuart Schmidt and Thomas Kochan (1972), we start with the 
assumption that ethnic competition is not a necessary condition for conflict potential. As we 
shall see below, Schmidt and Kochan argue that ‘compatible goals and perceived 
independence of action’ in diverse communities might reduce the likelihood of conflict. In 
this article we examine the conflict potential in Ukraine before the war and reflect on lessons 
still to be learned going forward in the current phase of ‘no peace, no war’. The first section 
reviews the literature around competing explanations of the conflict and seriously investigates 
the often-heard claim that at heart, this conflict is an ethno-nationalist war nourished by 
geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia. 
Here we introduce in fuller detail the conflict potential model we apply to Ukraine. The next 
section looks at the conditions for conflict that led to the Euromaidan protests, the subsequent 
annexation of Crimea, and the separatist movement in the Donbas. The third section examines 
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the potentials for peace and the prospect of conflict potential going forward. Based on our 
analytical framework, we suggest that the conditions for peace are greatly outweighed by the 
conditions for further conflict. Finally, we look at larger geopolitical dimensions that appear 
to have developed in tandem with the war in Ukraine. First, though, we must consider how we 
will explain the likelihood of conflict in the former Soviet Union.
Understanding Conflict Potential
What are the causes of war in Ukraine? The literature would suggest a host of reasons, from 
geopolitics and state capacity to proxy wars and competing oligarchs (Dragneva & Wolczuk 
2016; Fedotov 2015; Kulyk 2016; 2017). Yet it is hard to escape the ethnic dimensions that 
exist between the nominal Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities in Ukraine, 
which are the focus of much of the existing literature around the ethnopolitics of the former 
Soviet Union (Brubaker 1994; Furtado & Hechter 1992; Sasse 2002; G. Smith & Wilson 
1997). We say ‘nominal’ because the overlap between ethnicity and language is at best 
tenuous; besides, the situation is too complex to simply say that there exist an ethnic 
Ukrainian side and an ethnic Russian side with overlapping languages split down the middle. 
Some people in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine undoubtedly saw themselves as Russian, spoke 
Russian, and lamented the loss of the Soviet Union and the political space they had shared 
with the rest of Russia. Nonetheless, the notion that they are a distinct ethnic group is 
misplaced and too easily used by contemporary commentators to recast the post-Soviet period 
and simplify the war as it is at the time of writing (Sasse 2002). This is not to deny that 
protection of a ‘Russian’ community in Ukraine was a pretext that the Russian Federation 
cited to justify its forceful occupation of Crimea and its contribution of military aid and 
Russian combat forces to the breakaway regions in the two eastern oblasts of Donetsk and 
Luhansk. As in many of the world’s multiethnic places, ethnicity is easy to say but harder to 
find on the ground (Onuch & Hale 2018).
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While we cannot discern an ethnic cleavage in Ukraine, competitive politics has fomented 
rivalry between Kyiv and Donbas, the country’s largest economic centres. Obviously, distinct 
centre-periphery dynamics overlapped with the predominantly Russian-speaking eastern 
Ukraine and Crimea, where anti-politics is as easily identifiable as nationalist politics was in 
the post-Soviet period. Despite the difficulty of designating these two groups as Ukrainian 
and Russian, we can say that social cleavages arose out of differences between the fortunes, 
industrial ambitions, primary trading partners, and of course the oligarchs lording over 
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea on one hand and Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine on the other 
(Pleines 2016). The nationalism literature could construe this as regional nationalism rather 
than ethno-nationalism (Ragin 1977).
Nationalism literature is helpful here, especially that concerning how centre-periphery 
relationships produce competition and conflict across and between geographical space. For 
instance, Michael Hechter (Hechter 1975; 1987; Hecter & Levi 1979) has argued that regional 
differences can be powerful drivers of what he referred to as ‘ethno-regional’ groups, leading 
to political contention if not outright conflict. Otherwise known as ‘reactive ethnicity theory’, 
this line of thought, pursued by Hechter and others like Juan Diez Medrano (1994) and 
Francois Neilson (1985), argues that nationalist sentiment can derive from what Hechter’s 
(1975) work terms ‘internal colonialism’, meaning that centre-periphery relations take on the 
extractive, asymmetric relations of a colonial system. This ‘internal colonialism’ is reinforced 
by cultural and economic differences over language, religion and local culture. In his own 
work, Hechter focuses on Great Britain’s ‘Celtic fringe’, where cultural and economic 
discrepancies persist although language difference does not. Donald Horowitz (1985), in his 
tome Ethnic Groups in Conflict, similarly argued that so-called ranked (asymmetric) and 
unranked (symmetric) systems had varying competitive tendencies, whether co-located or not. 
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Alternatively, ethnic competition theory suggests that  political, social, or economic shocks 
bring ethnic groups into competition as previous systems are destabilised. For instance, Susan 
Olzak (1992) argues that tipping points are key to explaining why groups go from peaceful 
coexistence to collective action. The argument here, like others that could also be categorised 
as ethnic competition theory (Barth 1969; Barth & Noel 1972; Hannan 1979; Ragin 1977), is 
that there exists a latent conflict potential between groups that is somehow determined and 
mobilised by a degree of structural change. The collapse of the Soviet Union was arguably 
such a change. Significantly, ethnic competition theory often left the notion of ethnicity 
uncontested, focusing instead on how groups may come into competition for resources, 
namely jobs and sectoral control. Engagement with something like resource mobilisation 
theory shows how some may argue that this newly stimulated competition over resources 
could foster fresh potential for conflict between groups (for a recent study, see Domjan & 
Stone 2010; Jenkins 1983).
Ethnic competition theory concentrates on the role of competition as a key indicator of 
conflict potential. The organisational studies literature is helpful here because competition is a 
natural state of any organisation. Here we undertake a conceptual stretch to refer to the 
nation-state as an organisation, reflecting Max Weber’s understanding of the state as a social 
organisation (Weber 1947; see also Milward 1999). State institutions’ way of managing this 
competition determines the conflict potential. More importantly, changes in the circumstances 
of competition lead to even greater uncertainty, a condition that afflicts post-Soviet Ukraine to 
this day. Stuart Schmidt and Thomas Kochan (1972) suggested that conflict potential depends 
on how this uncertainty impacts on three factors: goal incompatibility, perceived opportunity 
for interference by others, and the degree to which resources are shared. We will take each in 
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turn to reveal how these factors relate to the conditions for conflict past and present, as well as 
the potential for conflict and peace in the future.
Goal incapability
Schmidt and Kochan’s conceptual model of conflict potential suggests that goal incapability 
is the primary prerequisite. The authors do not refer simply to divergent goals, but to goals 
that are ‘not simultaneously attainable’. This is illustrated in the way Ukraine has tried to 
position itself geopolitically since independence. After the Soviet Union ended, Ukraine had 
grounds to become an independent nation while also aligning itself closely with the Russian 
Federation. Indeed, this balance is noticeable between two mandates in the policies of 
Ukrainian presidents prior to the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’, when both Leonid Kravchuk 
(1991-94) and Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) sought to display Ukrainian independence while 
maintaining good diplomatic and trade relationships with Russia (Kuzio 2003; 2007). After 
the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s geopolitical position became much more political as its 
governments vacillated between pro-Western (i.e. NATO) and pro-Russian foreign policies, 
often seeking to hold both these objectives at the same time. Yet even though a positive 
relationship with the West and Russia is or at least was achievable, prior to the current war in 
Ukraine, the two geopolitical postures are not simultaneously attainable. Even within the 
balancing act of the Kravchuk and Kuchma presidencies, these tensions were palpable, 
especially considering the constant issue of Crimea’s difference from the rest of Ukraine and 
its special status as the host of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. We discussed these tensions in a 
study on how the Kosovo situation affected the prospects of Crimea and the future of 
Ukraine-Russia relations. In retrospect it looks prescient yet also naïve about the chances of 
Russian military aggression on Ukrainian sovereign territory (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2013). 
Furthermore, we argue that any assessment of Ukraine has to take into account oligarchs, their 
politics, and the rivalry between those in Kyiv and those in Donetsk. The war has not been 
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conducted neatly between these two groups, given the importance of larger Russian economic 
interests in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, and the truism that war is bad for business.1 Goal 
incapability is easy to identify among the many actors in Ukraine, leading up to the conflict. 
However, while goal incompatibility may explain the motivation for conflict, our conceptual 
model tells us it ‘says nothing about perceived ability to engage in it’ (Schmidt & Kochan 
1972, p. 362) – to understand that, additional factors are needed.
Perceived opportunity for interference by others
Although Schmidt and Kochan (1972, p. 362) accept that there are various reasons to see goal 
incapability as a prime condition for conflict potential, they argue that ‘the perceived 
opportunity for interfering with [the] attainment of one another’s goals’ is key to assessing the 
increased probability of conflict. Let us momentarily contrast this approach to the ethnic 
competition theory, which says that shocks to the market and/or society put ethnic groups in 
increasing proximity to each other, whereupon competition arises. Meanwhile, this 
organisational studies approach to conflict potential also posits that a) perceptions are 
important and b) the focus is on goal attainment. Building on Schmidt and Kochan, Deborah 
Kolb and Linda Putnam (1992) argue that this perception is inherently linked to emotion in 
conflict, building on what national identity literature (e.g. Curticapean 2007) would identify 
as polarisation and what social identity theory literature (Tajfel & Turner 1979) would refer to 
as the reification of the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy. Schmidt and Kochan (1972, p. 362) see 
the evidence of interference as important, but it is the perception of interference by others that 
is the key determinant of conflict potential. This perception of intervention in goal attainment 
became increasingly important in Ukraine following the 2004 Orange Revolution, as we noted 
above. Especially in the cases of Ukrainian oligarchs, there is considerable overlap between 
those who hold political power and those who generate wealth, meaning that if you are a 
1 On oligarchs, see e.g., Kuzio (2005); Kudelia & Kuzio (2015)
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political winner, you are also an economic winner. This ‘winning’ has implications for the 
success of Ukraine’s competing regions. Perhaps even more importantly, however, post-
Orange governments have called Crimea’s designation as an autonomous region within a 
united Ukraine into question. The perception of interference by others (Kyiv politicians, in 
this case) was easily pinpointed among those who lost status in the changing political 
landscape.
Degree to which resources are shared
The final component of the conceptual model is the degree to which resources are shared. 
Schmidt and Kochan focus on political opportunities that arise when resources are shared, 
which lead to asymmetric distribution or else to symmetric distribution via institutional 
cooperation. In other words, shared resources can be a condition for conflict or peace 
potential. A lack of shared resources would mean a lack of interdependent activities and thus 
low potential for conflict. This focus on shared resources is seen in more recent literature 
following the Schmidt and Kochan model. For instance, Mercy Derkyi et al. (2014) found that 
shared access and rights to land is a key indicator of conflict potential in Ghana. Similarly, 
Negasi Solomon et al. (2018) recognise that shared resources and interdependence are key 
determinants of conflict in the Horn of Africa. In Ukraine, the lack of sustainable economic 
development after independence, alongside state organs’ powerlessness to prevent the 
consolidation of political and economic power bases, suggests that as long as the state 
continues in its fragile condition, the potential for conflict in Ukraine will grow. Looking 
forward, we must ask whether these conditions have changed since the war began, and 
whether Ukraine has developed the capacity to avoid further and future conflict.
In this literature review and analytical model discussion, we examine the centre-periphery 
relations in Ukraine, limited and thus shared resources, the establishment of a ‘winner take 
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all’ politico-economic system, and a distinct yet uncertain power balance between oligarchs in 
Kyiv and the Donbas. The situation maps onto Schmidt and Kochan’s model (1972, p. 362), 
set out below.
To sum up here, we argue that in the dysfunctional state of Ukraine following independence, 
increasing competition over resources, together with a corresponding geopolitical frame, 
increased conflict potential following the Orange Revolution and especially the Euromaidan 
protests. Furthermore, as we will show, these conditions for conflict potential persist and bode 
ill for the prospects of sustainable peace.
Methodology
The basis for undertaking this study is an important question that links our research question 
to the structural drivers of conflict potential in Eastern Ukraine, and our analytical model to 
our methodological approach. We have identified the set of relevant data needed to test our 
argument that in a dysfunctional state, increasing competition over resources and a 
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geopolitical frame contribute to conflict escalation. Thus, we should be able to identify 
‘perceived goal incompatibility’, ‘perceived opportunity for interference’, and ‘shared 
resources’, that is, the structural drivers of conflict potential that facilitate conflict escalation 
in Eastern Ukraine. The main data collection method was textual analysis of official 
statements, speeches, newspaper interviews with official representatives, relevant legislative 
documents, official reports, and official statistics. We also carried out participant observation 
and interviews with subject matter experts. This enabled us to establish an analytical narrative 
that maximises data reliability. Use of multiple sources also allowed us to compensate for our 
limited access to policymakers and leaders in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s 
Republics. Given the sensitive nature of this article, we applied a strict anonymisation 
approach to all 18 interviews with experts. We combined face-to-face interviews with 
interviews via Skype and e-mail. Our interlocutors were informed of the research purpose of 
the interview and our anonymisation policy (see the list of interviews in the Appendix).
Origins of conflict in Eastern Ukraine: Ukraine as a crossroads
In 2014, Ukraine was considered an endemically weak state. Robert I. Rotberg distinguishes 
among varieties of weak, failing, and failed states. An ‘endemically weak state’ is one where 
the state’s weakness is preconditioned by a set of prevailing geographic, physical, or 
fundamental economic constraints:
Weak states typically harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal 
tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent. Urban crime 
rates tend to be higher and increasing (...). Schools and hospitals show signs of 
neglect, particularly outside the main cities. GDP per capita and other critical 
economic indicators have fallen or are falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of venal 
Page 10 of 50






























































For Peer Review Only
11
corruption are embarrassingly high and escalating. Weak states usually honour rule of 
law precepts in the breach. They harass civil society. (Rotberg 2003, p. 4) 
Stewart Patrick, citing van de Walle, describes an endemically weak state as one that is ‘not at 
major risk of conflict, but which is characterized by low growth, anemic institutions and 
patrimonial system of political leadership’ (Patrick 2007, p. 651). A state’s weakness is 
measured in terms of economic performance, governance, security and crime, human 
development, demography, and the environment. It is driven by several factors, most 
importantly the state’s development, legitimacy, and security (Carment 2011). 
A state’s weakness does not automatically denote disintegration or violent conflict, and not all 
weak states experience violent conflict. Most authors agree that state weakness is instead a 
precipitative factor in conflict escalation because weak or failing states are unable to mediate 
between competing interests (see again the review by Patrick 2007). In Ukraine’s case, the 
role that Ukrainian institutions and centre-periphery relations play in the conflict is discussed 
as part of the debate about whether the conflict is driven by geopolitics or domestic 
developments. Meanwhile, the body of existing literature on the conflict in Ukraine is focused 
mainly on geopolitical explanations, in particular the great-power competition between Russia 
and the West (e.g. Samokhvalov 2015; N. R. Smith 2015), with less emphasis on domestic 
developments in Ukraine prior to the crisis (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2013). Lastly, 
Malyarenko and Wolff identify the conflict as a ‘blended conflict played in an 
antagonistically penetrated region’. They argue that 
it is about the dynamic connectedness of actors, structures, and other factors at and 
across different levels of analysis: horizontally, vertically and diagonally (….) Thus, 
multiple actors and alliances of actors on the ground and beyond are in constant flux 
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and contextually variable, not least because their agendas differ from local to global 
aspirations with punctual but no sustainable overlap. (Malyarenko & Wolff 2019)
Applying the logic of blended conflict to our study, we argue that what is commonly called  
the Ukrainian crisis consists of several distinct but closely related and partially overlapping 
conflict constellations, each with its own causes and dynamics. The escape of then president 
Yanukovych and his government weakened the Ukrainian state, leading to its temporary 
failure in January-March 2014. The consequent paralysis of state institutions became a 
precipitative factor in the violent escalation of a number of conflicts among different actors 
and alliances of actors. As a country with weak state institutions and a divided society, 
Ukraine has repeatedly found itself at risk of revolution and violent regime change that could 
potentially lead to disintegration (Minakov 2017). In fact, due to the incompletion of state-
building processes, the so-called revolutions of both 2004/05 and 2013/14 sent Ukraine back 
to the drawing board to revise the shared meaning of statehood and the nature of the social 
contract between Ukrainian elites and society – as though it were 1991 again and Ukraine was 
only just declaring its independence.2 Thus, since 1991, the potential for escalation of these 
latent tensions in Ukraine has hovered over the different actors and alliances – great powers 
pursuing their geopolitical interests, domestic elites operating i  a fragile institutional 
framework, local actors with legitimate grievances – on the ground and beyond. Conflict 
potentials increase when the state’s capacity decreases dramatically. 
2 See e.g. Minakov (2018): ‘In the last twenty-five years, Ukraine survived two revolutionary cycles, such as 
1991–2004 and 2005–2014 [...] started with the promise of political liberties and economic freedoms in 1991 and 
2005. Quite soon after, the oligarchic groups and presidents forgot their promises. Among the competitive 
financial-political groups (FGP) that controlled all major private sector industries, public owned companies, and 
core posts in government parliament and the courts, one group would usually take over the presidential post. 
With time, the presidents promoted the interests of their groups to the extent that they united other oligarchic 
groups and grassroots protesters against authoritarian rulers. These unions have twice jointly chased them down’. 
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Unlike the peaceful Orange Revolution in 2004, the Euromaidan in 2013/14 became known 
for violent clashes between protesters and police forces that caused more than 100 deaths in 
the city of Kyiv. This violent protest in Kyiv was augmented by popular uprisings in Western 
Ukraine (protesters took over administrative buildings; military and police units blocked 
roads) and a less conspicuous though no less hostile anti-Euromaidan mobilisation in Eastern 
Ukraine and Crimea.3 Since March 2014, several additional factors had facilitated conflict 
escalation. An unprecedented national and local-level paralysis of state power and state 
institutions reigned when then president Yanukovych fled Ukraine with all his government 
and senior officials, at a time when institutions were weak and personification of political 
power remained a Ukrainian tradition. The new self-appointed government suffered from low 
legitimacy and high levels of uncertainty about the possibility of a Russian invasion and 
restoration of Yanukovych (the Russian government and media stirred this unease). 
Meanwhile the  beneficiaries  of the Euromaidan played a ‘zero-sum’ game characterised by 
unwillingness to compromise with political opponents [(Партія регіонів) Party of the 
Regions, (Комуністична партія України) Communist Party, Eastern Ukrainian elites) and 
the experience of the ‘unfinished’ Orange Revolution. 
Between late 2013 and August 2014 (Minsk I agreement), the conflict escalated in several 
directions:
3 According to a public opinion poll conducted in January 2014, about 50% of Ukraine’s residents supported the 
Euromaidan, vs. 42% who did not support it. Public support differed among the various Ukrainian provinces, 
reaching about 80% in Western Ukraine vs. 63% in Central Ukraine, 30% in Eastern Ukraine, and 20% in 
Southern Ukraine and Crimea (‘Yevromaidan pidtrymuie 50 % ukraintsiv, Antymaidan – 27 %’, Ukrainska 
Pravda, 21 January 2014, available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/21/7010495/, accessed 23 
March 2019).
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(a) The Euromaidan (public protests on the Maidan square in Kyiv) were triggered by then 
president Victor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. The 
Euromaidan movement comprised several groups motivated by diverse ideologies and 
interests. For example, a pro-European group demanded democratic reforms while right-wing 
nationalists clamoured for ethnolinguistic dictatorship (Ishchenko 2018). The economic super 
elites (oligarchs) treated the protests as a chance to replace or weaken the current ruling clan 
(the so-called Donetskie). Negotiations between President Yanukovych and the parliamentary 
opposition, mediated by the German, French, and Polish foreign ministers in the presence of a 
senior Russian diplomat, resulted in the so-called Kyiv Agreement of 21 February 2014.4 The 
Kyiv Agreement provided for a transition period until the end of 2014, along with a 
government of national unity, constitutional reform, and a presidential election held sooner 
than previously planned. However, the protesters on the Maidan rejected the agreement as 
insufficient. It collapsed within days, and President Yanukovych decamped to exile in Russia. 
Several months of public protests on the Maidan had fostered polarisation within Ukrainian 
society. Not only did local clashes pit pro-European and pro-Russian supporters against one 
another; they also arose between different groups of elites competing for political power and 
economic resources. The Kremlin viewed the Euromaidan as Ukraine’s geopolitical turn 
towards the EU, and thus as a threat to its influence and role as a regional hegemon. This 
perception of loss provoked Russia’s response in Crimea and Donbas.5 This caused the 
conflict to proliferate across additional dimensions.
4 ‘Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine’, The Guardian, 21 February 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text, 
accessed 17 April 2018. 
5 In an interview for the documentary The World Order 2018, Vladimir Putin revealed details about his 
communication with official Washington during the Euromaidan. As Putin explained it to a journalist, the 
American leadership had cheated him: Washington asked Putin to change Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to 
deploy Ukrainian armed forces against the protesters on the Maidan. Later, the West broke this informal 
agreement with Putin and supported the coup d’état (‘Putin: SSHA Prosili Sdelat Vse Chtobi Yanukovych ne 
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(b) An elite-driven conflict emerged between the Donetskie in Donbas and the newly appointed 
government in Kyiv over demands for greater local self-government. Facing the prospect of 
political marginalisation at the centre after the president’s departure, the established local 
elites who had made up Yanukovych’s power base were keen to maximise their local 
autonomy in order to protect their local assets and thrive economically. As one of our 
interviews suggests, the central and peripheral elites’ conflict over greater autonomy for the 
latter was rooted in history, economic geography, and the ethnolinguistic structure of 
Ukrainian society: ‘L cal elites in Ukraine have always sought for greater autonomy, thus, a 
latent conflict has always existed. The weakening state capacity facilitates the escalation of 
latent tensions’ (Interview 1).6 
(c) Elite-driven conflict led different local elites in Ukraine (e.g., between the Donetskie and 
Dnipropetrovskie) to establish and fund a number of paramilitary battalions, such as Dnipro, 
Azov, Donbas, and Tornado, to be used as private armies pursuing control over assets in 
eastern Ukraine (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2016; Aliyev 2016).
(d) A mass-driven conflict – the so-called anti-Maidan – arose between the relatively pro-Russian 
population in Eastern Ukraine and the newly formed government in Kyiv. Initially, nonviolent 
protests were organised by local community leaders motivated by fear and resentment of the 
new government in Kyiv, which lacked legitimacy in the eyes of local protesters. However, 
this protest movement lacked meaningful and effective coordination from the outset. After the 
local Ukrainian elites’ exodus from Donbas, it rapidly fragmented and degenerated into 
warlordism (Matveeva 2017; Pinchuk 2017).
Primenil Armiyu’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 March 2018, available at: https://rg.ru/2018/03/07/putin-ssha-prosili-rf-
sdelat-vse-chtoby-ianukovich-ne-primenil-armiiu.html, accessed 25 January 2019).
6 By way of illustration, the weakness of Ukraine’s state institutions facilitated centrifugal tendencies in other 
provinces of Ukraine as well. Outside of Donbas and Crimea, centrifugal tendencies were manifest in 
Transcarpathis and Odesa oblasts. In some cases these centrifugal forces rendered the Ukrainian government 
incapable of exercising effective control over certain areas/regions (International Crisis Group 2017).
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(e) The annexation of Crimea by Russia, despite its local dimension, was overall an intrastate 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
(f) Aiming to destabilise the pro-Western government in Kyiv, Russia propagated and supported 
an effort that has been at the heart of the violent conflict in Donbas since 2014. It accounts for 
the overwhelming majority of conflict-related deaths, displacement, and destruction, and is 
often regarded as a proxy war (Galeotti 2016; Jonsson & Seely, 2015; Katchanovski 2016; 
Robinson 2016). Having identified the different, simultaneous, partly overlapping conflicts in 
Ukraine since late 2013, let us now attend to the various actors and the structures and contexts 
that form their operational sphere.
Crimea in Crisis
The extensive internationalisation of the Ukrainian crisis was manifest in Russia’s March 
2014 annexation of Crimea. The Russian experts we interviewed suggested that the 
‘reunification of Crimea with Russia’ (as Russian politicians define the annexation), Russia’s 
attempts to fuel the pro-Russian uprising in south-eastern Ukraine (the Novorossiya project), 
and the undeclared war in Donbas are bound together in a ‘big deal’ on Ukraine that Russia 
wanted to propose to the West (Interview 2). As our second expert interviewee suggested, 
‘The methods of Russia can change over time, but the geopolitical importance of Ukraine 
predetermines Russia’s active involvement in Ukrainian affairs’ (Interview 3). The goal of 
this ‘big deal’ is to establish, or re-establish, a Russia-friendly political regime in Kyiv and 
empower Eastern Ukrainian elites – whom the Kremlin believes to be traditionally aligned 
with Russia – to strengthen federalisation and local self-government through changes to 
Ukraine’s constitution (Interview 4). At the military-political level, Russia took a 
comprehensive approach to warfare, deploying proxy soldiers, private military companies, 
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unmarked special forces, propaganda efforts and diplomatic pressure (Galeotti 2016; Jonsson 
& Seely 2015). 
Ukraine demonstrates that a country without functioning, legitimate institutions is highly 
vulnerable to ‘hybrid invasion’ by an external actor. In 2014, the Ukrainian state’s fragility 
was manifest when its obviously weak, demoralised armed forces proved unable to protect the 
borders of the country (Ministry of Defence 2013; SIPRI 2015; International Institute of 
Strategic Studies 2017). Russia’s policy towards Ukraine relies on the linkages between 
Ukrainian society and Russia (e.g. their significant share of ethnic Russians and Russian 
speakers, common history, and cultural and economic ties). As a regional power, Russia also 
uses different types of leverage to keep Ukraine in its orbit, mainly economic privileges 
extended to secure the support and loyalty of Ukrainian oligarchs (e.g., discounted sale of 
Russian natural gas was proposed in exchange for keeping the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s base 
in Sevastopol until 2042) and ‘soft power’ – a broad network of Russian media, joint cultural 
and education projects, and the Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchy in Ukraine. 
In independent Ukraine, Crimea has always been a zone of geopolitical risk due to its location 
on the country’s periphery, population of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, history, 
strong cultural ties with Russia, and stable pro-Russian self-determination attitudes.7 
According to a public opinion survey (Razumkov Centre 2008a), only about 9% of the 
Crimean population saw themselves as Ukrainian patriots, but 75% considered themselves to 
have been subjected to forced ‘Ukrainisation’. Polls conducted by the same organisation 
between 18 October 2008 and 9 November 2008 also indicated that some 79% of the 
7 To our knowledge, there was no systematic research or monitoring of the sociopolitical situation in Crimea 
before 2014. Our conclusions in this article rely on think tanks whose research was independent in scope, 
purpose and methodology. 
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population had a favourable opinion of a union of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus (Razumkov 
Center 2008b). A different poll carried out between 8 and 18 February 2014, while allowing 
for a significant margin of error, found 41% of Crimea’s residents to be in favour of a union 
between Ukraine and Russia (KIIS 2014).
The Razumkov Centre’s public opinion research has identified three anchors keeping the 
peninsular population within the Ukrainian state, despite strong stances on self-determination: 
Crimea’s autonomous status, Russian language use, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s naval 
base in Sevastopol (Razumkov Center 2008a; 2008b; 2011). The Euromaidan protests in Kyiv 
provoked sharp polarisation between different groups in Crimea, but they also motivated 
ethnic Russians and Russian speakers to join and strengthen the anti-Maidan movement.8 
Adopted at a moment of high polarisation between pro-Euromaidan and anti-Euromaidan 
supporters (i.e., the day after Ukraine’s President Yanukovych fled Ukraine), the Law of 
Ukraine ‘On nullification of the Law of Ukraine “On the Basis for a Public Language Policy” 
withdrew the privileges for Russian language in the Ukraine’s Russian-speaking provinces 
granted by the nullified law.9 As one expert explained it: 
This law was adopted at a very inappropriate moment, manifesting the intentions of 
Kyiv’s new ruling elites to withdraw the rights granted to the ethnic Russians and 
Russian-speaking population by Yanukovych and his Party of the Regions. The 
adoption of this law was accompanied by intensive speculations about the status of 
8 Zeveleva O. (2019) How ordinary Crimeans helped Russia to annex their home, available at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/author/olga-zeveleva-
2/?fbclid=IwAR0gBzhnd0KuJ5HZC9dmteFwV3aK2HQCLqfPiUY_xqhlxle4emgm0J8rpbY accessed 23 March 
2019
9 The Law of Ukraine ‘On cancellation of Law of Ukraine “On the Base for Public Language Policy”’ No. 1190, 
22.02.2014. 
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Crimean autonomy and the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol10. In fact, the law 
galvanised the anti-Maidan protests in Crimea and Donbas, which had been rather 
staid prior to its adoption. (Interview 5) 
In the first months after the ‘victory’ of the Euromaidan, President Yanukovych and his 
government made their getaways from Ukraine while the newly appointed government 
consolidated its power in Kyiv’s central institutions (parliament, army, prosecutor’s office, 
police) so as to eliminate the possibility of reinstatement of the exiled president. From 
February 2014 until the early presidential elections that May, Kyiv’s new ruling elites kept a 
distance from actions that might undermine their fragile position and legitimacy – including 
military operations in Crimea and Donbas (Interview 6, Interview 7) (see Ivanov 2017).11 
Shorthand documents from emergency meetings of the Council of National Security and 
Defence of Ukraine on 28 February 2014 (‘On Urgent Measures to ensure National Security, 
10 The Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol was a permanent bone of contention between political parties 
with declared pro-Russian and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Ukraine’s so-called democratic parliamentary 
opposition [(Блок Юлії Тимошенко) ‘Yuliya Timoshenko’s ‘Block’, (Наша Україна) ‘Our Ukraine’, and 
(Всеукраїнське об'єднання «Свобода») ‘Svoboda’) and leaders of the Euromaidan permanently claimed for a 
denouncement of ‘Kharkiv Agreements’ signed by president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and president of 
Russia Dmitry Medvedev on 21 April 2010. See, for example ’NG: Ochikuiutsia Kharkivski ugody-2’, 
Korrespondent, 20 June 2013, available at: https://ua.korrespondent.net/world/worldabus/1572656-ng-
ochikuyutsya-harkivski-ugodi-2, accessed 2 May 2018.
11 In a newspaper interview and in testimony before a Ukrainian court (supported by the testimony of then 
Minister of Defence of Ukraine Mikhailo Koval), Oleksandr Turchinov, then the acting president of Ukraine and 
current General Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defence, explained: ‘The first task was to 
conduct the presidential elections openly and transparently in order to secure the legitimacy of the newly 
appointed Ukrainian government (…) There was widespread sabotage among  public servants at all levels. Many 
of them did not believe we would be able to keep order and political power. They were really waiting for 
Russia’s invasion and the return of Yanukovych’. 
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Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’) demonstrate that the Ukrainian 
government’s decision to avoid military operations when responding to Russia’s occupation 
and annexation of Crimea was informed by several factors:
(a) an assessment concluding that a full-fledged Russian military invasion to restore the 
Yanukovych government and impose further consequences was highly probable and warning 
that, ‘Russia will certainly use the ex-president of Ukraine’; furthermore, ‘[t]here is a 
concentration of Russian troops along the Ukraine-Russia border. Russia is mobilising 8,000 
troops, 761 tanks, 2,200 troop carriers, 130 helicopters and 90 military aircrafts in the 
vicinities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk’ (Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine 
2014, p. 10);
(b) a ‘widespread betrayal of Ukraine by military, police and other law-enforcement officers 
located in the Crimea (…) who went over to command of the (Russian) military invasion’ 
(Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine 2014, p. 5); 
(c) widespread support for Russian invasion among the local population in Crimea (Council of 
National Security and Defence of Ukraine 2014, p. 6). This led the Ukrainian government to 
act so as to ‘avoid armed clashes and casualties among the local civilian population, which 
could provide Russia with justification for Russian military pressure’ (Council of National 
Security and Defence of Ukraine 2014, p. 5);
(d) the low capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces and low support for a new, post-Maidan 
military government : 
Military and siloviki are demoralized (.…) They are intolerant of the new government 
and they are not ready to carry out our orders (…) The moral and psychological 
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climate of the military community is very low if not mutinous. We do not have an 
army. Today we can potentially muster no more than 5,000 battle-ready troops from 
all Ukraine. (Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine 2014, p. 11)
Therefore, Kyiv’s reaction to the annexation of Crimea has mostly taken the form of 
diplomatic efforts to initiate and maintain sanctions on Russia and prompt international 
organisations like the UN, OSCE, and Council of Europe, to issue decisions in support of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Ukraine has also filed a number of claims in international 
courts seeking compensation for its assets in Crimea. The Ukrainian parliament passed a law 
acknowledging the temporary occupation of Crimea and establishing privileges for Ukrainian 
businesses operating in Crimea. It also laid the foundations for protection of the human rights 
of Ukrainian citizens living in Crimea (Law of Ukraine, 1207-18). Similar concerns about the 
legitimacy of the post-Euromaidan government and low public support for the Euromaidan in 
Eastern Ukraine explain the deference of Kyiv’s counterinsurgency operation in the Donbas 
province of Ukraine. 
Origins of conflict in Eastern Ukraine
The potential for conflict, as indicated by the level of competition and increasing zero-sum 
outcomes of Ukrainian politics, increased in tandem with the unmet expectations of the 
Orange Revolution and the unsigned agreement with the EU. In 2014, the flight of then 
president Viktor Yanukovych, his government, and his ‘business family’ to Russia brought 
about a temporary failure of the Ukrainian state: unable to exercise effective control over its 
territory, it was consequently unable to protect its national borders. The public support and 
legitimacy of the newly appointed post-Euromaidan government was limited because public 
support for the Euromaidan itself was limited, especially in eastern and southern parts of 
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Ukraine.12 The paralysis of vital state institutions brought about the state’s temporary failure 
in March and April 2014, which in turn facilitated the conflict’s escalation in several different 
dimensions. First, Yanukovych’s flight triggered competition among Ukrainian elites vying 
for political power and economic resources.13 In Ukrainian politics, the rule ‘winner gets all’ 
is manifest in winners’ efforts to consolidate political power and economic resources while 
simultaneously undermining the economic potential of potential political competitors14. In 
2014, the post-Euromaidan government and civil society referred to their experience in 
2004/05, when compr mise with Eastern Ukrainian elites (the Party of the Regions) after the 
Orange Revolution led to the latter’s restoration as a major power in Ukrainian politics after 
the parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2007 and the presidential elections of 2010. In 2014, 
in step with the regime change in Kyiv, influential oligarchs like Yuliya Timoshenko and Igor 
Kolomoiskii returned to Kyiv and Ukrainian politics and sued for restitution of their business 
assets, which had been appropriated by the previously dominant ‘clan’. 
Moreover, according to open-source information and our previous research, paramilitary 
battalions (both pro-governmental and pro-Russian) were created, first as private armies that 
oligarchs used to protect their property under the conditions of temporary state failure in early 
2014, outlined above. Entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens countrywide armed themselves and 
established self-defence groups for the same purpose (Interview 11, 12). Unlike in 2005 (the 
12 ‘Yevromaidan pidtrymuie 50 % ukraintsiv, Antymaidan – 27 %’, Ukrainska Pravda, 21 January 2014, 
available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/01/21/7010495/, accessed 23 March 2019).
13 For example, our interlocutors representing the business community in Donbas emphasised that the frequent 
cases of enforced changes in property rights (sometimes involving torture, kidnap, and murder) began after the 
institutional failure of the Ukrainian state in Donetsk and Luhansk in April-May 2014 (Interview 8-10).
14 The rule ‘winner gets all’ is evident in the consecutive domination of regional politico-economic clans in 
Ukrainian politics: Dnipropetrovskie have been affiliated with President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, Donetskie 
with President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, and Podolskie with President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko.
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Orange Revolution), the post-Euromaidan government and civil society rejected any 
compromise with Yanukovych and the Eastern Ukrainian elites who supported him. Civil 
society organisations pressed for radical change towards democratic decision making, 
transparency, and good governance, which they believed could be achieved through purging 
the public servants, police, and military who were employed by Yanukovych’s government 
(Interview 13, 14)15. Ukrainian far-right movements used exclusionist ethnonational rhetoric 
to mobilise public support (Minakov 2017; Ishchenko 2018). 
Disillusionment with the Euromaidan was even greater in Donbas (i.e., the Donetsk and 
Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, the home region of ousted president Viktor Yanukovych), where 
78% of respondents considered th  Euromaidan an illegal coup d’état.16 As many as 59% of 
respondents in Donbas supported the federalisation of Ukraine, and about 31% supported the 
15 The Law of Ukraine ‘On Purification of Authorities’ N 1682-18 from 16.09.2014 (‘Law on Lustration’) 
together with other legislative documents consolidated the legitimacy of new political regime. E.g., the Law of 
Ukraine N 743-18 from 21 February 2014 ‘On Barring of Suit and Penalty for Individuals Participating in 
Peaceful Assembly’ (still in force) exempts participants of the Euromaidan protests from criminal liability for a 
wide spectrum of crimes they conducted during the Euromaidan, including violent change of the constitutional 
order or the capture of political power (article 109 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine), assassination of public 
servants (article 112), sabotage (article 113), wilful bodily injury (article 121), death threat (article 129), and 
others others (See ‘Law of Ukraine: On Barring of Suit and Penalty for Individuals Participating in Peaceful 
Assembly’, N 743-18, 21 February 2014, available at: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/743-18, accessed 31 
January 2019). Article 2 of The Law ‘On Purification’ identifies then president of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych 
as a ‘usurper of political power’; thus, ‘the lustration has been conducted to prevent those who assisted 
Yanukovych in his governance’ (‘Law of Ukraine ‘On Purification of Authorities’, N1682-18, 16 September 
2014, available at: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1682-18, accessed 31 January 2019).
16 ‘Mneniya I Vzglyadi Zhiteley Yugo – Vostoka: Aprel 2014‘, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 18 April 2018, available at: 
https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mneniya-i-vzglyady-zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html, accessed 
31 January 2019.
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separation of Donbas from Ukraine versus 56% who opposed it (Sociological Group «Rating» 
2014).
The processes of fragmentation in Donbas have deepened since March 2014. The senior 
political leadership of both oblasts, affiliated with the exiled president Viktor Yanukovych 
and the Donetskie, absconded. Mid-career public servants broadly ignored the decisions of the 
newly appointed government (Turchinov 2017). Absent a strong chain of command, some 
local mayors declared support for the situation in Crimea (e.g., Mayor of Slaviansk Nelya 
Shtepa) or just waited for a clearer political situation (e.g., Mayor of Donetsk Oleksander 
Lukianchenko, who governed the city of Donetsk until Strelkov’s army invaded in July 2014). 
Vladimir Putin’s former advisor Gleb Pavlovsky considered the temporary failure of the 
Ukrainian state and the resulting situation in Donbas as ‘a vegetative life form of a body 
without a head (…) Informal violence, blurred and uncertain (…) when you cannot 
understand whom you are dealing with. The front without a front line, where paramilitary 
troops which have uncertain ideologies, forms and territorial allocation, employ both baseball 
bats and ‘Buks’ (surface to air missiles) (Bykov 2016).
Russia’s campaign to destabilise the post-Euromaidan political regime in Kyiv incorporated 
its support for, and orchestration of, the anti-Maidan movements in Donbas (Interviews 2, 11). 
Russia’s support of the protest movement in Donbas evolved from its supply of money, 
volunteers, and weapons to covert invasion by mercenaries (Strelkov’s army) and direct 
military invasion by ‘vacationers’ in August 2014 (i.e. Russian special forces). When 
necessary, Russian regular forces were deployed for certain missions in Donbas. In this low-
intensity theatre, the integration of different arms – tanks, infantry, artillery, air defence – was 
carried out by battalion- or company-level tactical groups (Perssons 2016).
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The conflict escalated dramatically in the months between the international negotiations on 
the Eastern Ukrainian crisis in Geneva on 17 April 2014 and the later talks on 5 September 
2014 (Minsk I) and 11 February 2015 (Minsk II). The Geneva statement declared a need for 
an ‘inclusive, transparent and accountable constitutional process in Ukraine with the 
immediate establishment of a broader national dialogue with outreach to all of Ukraine’s 
regions and political constituencies’17. The Minsk agreements provided for the norm of 
special status for ‘separate parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’18.
The question of whether the Ukrainian state has sufficient capacity (economic resources, 
necessary legislation, institutions, and public support) to implement the Minsk agreement, is 
still open. In Ukraine, the rational  behind the implementation has sparked major policy 
debates. According to Lawrence Freedman, the failure of Minsk resulted from the lack of 
strategy or vision of a way to solve the conflict: ‘With no strategy for bringing their war to a 
conclusion, Ukraine and Russia are now seeking each other’s exhaustion’ (Freedman 2015). 
Volodymyr Gorbulin, then director of the government’s National Institute for Strategic 
Studies, suggested that ‘Ukraine signed the Minsk agreement under pressure’ and thus ‘has to 
strive for the changes in the format of future negotiations around Donbas, first of all with the 
aim to remove  the requirement of special status for Donbas within Ukraine and other claims 
towards Ukraine’s territorial-administrative arrangement from the subjects of future 
negotiations (…). The problem of conflict settlement in Donbas has to be solved along with 
17 ‘Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17: The full text’, Washington Post, 2014, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/joint-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-from-april-17-the-full-
text/2014/04/17/89bd0ac2-c654-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html?utm_term=.b09bf5ef1876, accessed 31 
January 2019.
18 ‘Full text of the Minsk agreement’, Financial Times, 12 February 2015, available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de, accessed 21 March 2019.
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the weakening of Russia as a geopolitical player and settlement of other frozen conflicts on 
the post-Soviet space’ (Gorbulin 2016).
Like other Ukrainian senior officials, the president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, emphasised 
that all peace agreements concerning settlement of the conflict in Donbas (the Geneva 
Agreement of 17 April 2014 and Minsk Agreements of 5 September 2014 and 11 February 
2015) advanced Russia’s interests only. Former President Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s 
representative in the Minsk group, suggested in a newspaper interview that ‘nobody believed 
in the Minsk agreement from the very beginning’19. Regarding Ukraine’s interest in the Minsk 
Agreements, Poroshenko explained: ‘Thanks to Minsk, we initiated a mechanism for 
international sanctions against Russia. We won some time for the creation of a new Ukrainian 
army and democratic reforms’20. In November 2017, Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov stated 
that ‘the Minsk Agreements exhausted themselves’. Avakov’s adviser, MP Anton 
Geraschenko, elaborated: ‘We needed the Minsk Agreements in 2014-2015. President of 
Ukraine Poroshenko brought together global leaders who put pressure on Russia. Together we 
stopped Russia’s military invasion onto Ukraine’s territory. In fact, Poroshenko and our 
diplomats cheated Russia. When we signed the Minsk Agreements, we understood that we 
would never implement them’21.
19 'Kuchma: Pochemu Minskie Soglasheniya Ne Podpisali‘, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, 16 December 2017, available at: 
https://zn.ua/POLITICS/kuchma-na-yes-pochemu-minskie-soglasheniya-ne-podpisali-merkel-olland-
poroshenko-i-putin-lichno-260257_.html; accessed 31.01.2019.
20 ‘Minskie soglasheniya ne ideal'ny, no blagodarya im nad Ukrainoi mirnoe nebo, - Poroshenko’, Censor.Net, 
22 August 2017, available at: 
https://censor.net.ua/news/452678/minskie_soglasheniya_ne_idealny_no_blagodarya_im_nad_ukrainoyi_mirnoe
_nebo_poroshenko, accessed 25 January 2019.
21 ‘Poroshenko i nashi diplomaty prosto obmanuli Rossiyu s Minskimi soglasheniyami”, - Anton Gerashchenko’, 
Strana.ua, 29 November 2017, available at: https://strana.ua/news/108247-herashchenko-prokommentiroval-
slova-avakova-o-smerti-minskikh-sohlashenij.html, accessed 25 March 2018.
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The Law of Ukraine ‘On Particularities of the State Policy on Providing State Sovereignty of 
Ukraine over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts’22. The law 
identifies Russia as an ‘occupying country’ and an aggressor against Ukraine. The Law 
acknowledges both Russia’s occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk and the DPR and LPR as 
‘Russian occupational administrations’. In fact, though, this law represents Ukraine’s 
withdrawal from the Minsk agreements, which were signed by so-called ‘representatives of 
the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (the status of the DPR and LPR has been 
debated in International Court of Justice proceedings).23 The law also marks an official 
legalised shift away from an intrastate definition of the violent conflict in Donbas, now treated 
as an interstate war in Ukraine’s foreign and security policy. As Ukraine is unable to win the 
war by military means, the low-intensity conflict has become (temporarily) frozen. 
Determining Conflict Potential
In step with our analytical model, the case of Ukraine shows that in a country that has neither 
functioning, legitimate institutions that engender loyalty in civil servants nor an inclusive 
society, external actors are able to use ‘goal incompatibility’ and ‘perceptions of interference’ 
to foster political change through collective violence. Hence Russia was able to construct and 
escalate conflict between state and non-state actors in Ukraine in 2014. Even if Russia made 
mistakes and miscalculated local support, it would be very difficult to undo things now and go 
back to the status ante in Ukraine. Systemic factors of state weakness – collapse of the army 
and governance, rent-seeking behaviour of the elites, lawlessness, anarchic political culture – 
created a favourable environment for implementation of Russian tactics of covert occupation 
22 The Law of Ukraine N7163 from 18.01.2018 ‘On Particularities of the State Policy on Providing State 
Sovereignty of Ukraine over Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast’ available at 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268-19 accessed 23 March 2019
23 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian 
Federation), 2017/2018, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/166, accessed 21 April 2018.
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and occupation by proxy. Meanwhile, the pre-existing conditions of conflict potential in 
Ukraine rendered the state incapable of responding so as to prevent the conflict.
Towards a new ‘frozen conflict’
Since February 2015 (Minsk II), the current ‘no peace, no war’ disposition towards the 
conflict in eastern Ukraine has been cemented. Applying our analytical model, we explain this 
situation as one in which actors with mutually incompatible goals pool their resources for 
achievements in the l ng run while reducing mutual dependency in the short and medium 
term to minimise the likelihood of immediate conflict. 
The logic of Kyiv’s policy of minimising Ukraine’s dependence on Russia, Crimea, and the 
uncontrolled part of Donbas derives from its interest in increasing the Ukrainian state and 
society’s resilience to external leverage and potentially destabilising linkages. A set of full-
fledged protective measures is aimed at blocking Russian influence and cutting ties between 
Ukraine and Russia, including the Russia-controlled Crimea and Donbas. The National 
Institute for Strategic Studies, a major governmental think tank affiliated with the 
administration of the president of Ukraine Poroshenko, explained the need to isolate Donetsk 
and Luhansk: 
The Russian threat has a long-term character (…) the conflict in eastern Ukraine 
become ‘frozen’ (…) therefore, the territory of separate regions of Donetsk and 
Luhansk oblasts should be properly localised until the beginning of reconciliation 
which means the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and full control over the 
occupied territories. (NISS 2017).  
One Ukrainian expert we interviewed explained the rationale behind Ukraine’s policy thusly: 
‘The reintegration of Donbas under Ukraine’s current weak institutions would likely lead to 
further disintegration of the country’ (Interview 1). Russian minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei 
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Lavrov , explained the role of the DPR and LPR in Russia’s policy towards Ukraine: ‘If we 
recognize DPR and LPR, we will lose Ukraine (…) We need all Ukraine’24.
Since 2014, Donetsk and Luhansk have been gradually excluded from Ukraine’s government-
controlled territories through the establishment of militarised fortifications and borders, 
withdrawal of Ukrainian state institutions and authorities, institutional exclusion and curbs on 
residents’ human rights, including possible termination of Ukrainian citizenship for residents 
of uncontrolled territories (President Poroshenko submitted the draft law N8297 to the 
Verkhovna Rada on 19 April 2018). In 2015, the Ukrainian government initiated economic 
and transport blockades to limit civilians’ movements from and to Donetsk and Luhansk. By 
2018, Kyiv had constructed two fortification lines around the war-affected territories and 
brought a special legal regime of civil-military administration into force in the Ukraine-
controlled Donbas. 
The institutional exclusion began with adoption of the Decree of the President of Ukraine 
N875 of 14 November 2014, according to which:
Functioning of all state-owned enterprises, public organisations, and establishments 
should be abrogated on separate territories in the zone of anti-terroristic operation; 
documentation and assets should be evacuated (…) National Bank of Ukraine shall 
discontinue serving accounts opened by legal entities and population in the ATO zone 
(….) Ministry of Foreign Affairs should inform General Secretary of Council of Europe 
about the implementation of measures incompatible with Ukraine’s obligations as a 
24 Sergei Lavrov: voini s Ukrainoi ne budet, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 17 December 2018, available at 
https://www.crimea.kp.ru/daily/26921/3968646/, accessed 24 March 2019
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signatory of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’. (President of Ukraine 2014)
Decree N875 suspended the functioning of Ukrainian public institutions and central and local 
governance bodies in the rebel-controlled territories. It also declared any form of self-
organisation and local governance in Donetsk and Luhansk illegal. Moreover, this Ukrainian 
legislation criminalised local residents’ and businesses’ participation in any form of 
cooperation with auth rities of the self-declared republics. Simultaneously, by decision of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine N595 from 11 July 2014, disbursements of pensions and 
other social benefits to citizens who had not moved out of the zone of anti-terrorist operations 
were likewise suspended. Since November 2014, Ukrainian legislation has gradually 
cemented the isolation of rebel-controlled territories (e.g., by amending the Laws of Ukraine 
‘On the fight against terrorism’, ‘On temporary measures for the period of ATO’, and ‘On 
special rule in some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’, among others). 
The economic and transport blockade of the uncontrolled territories is regulated by the Decree 
of the President of Ukraine N298 ‘On implementation of the decision of the Council for the 
National Security and Defence of Ukraine’ of 4 November 2014, ‘On the energy security of 
the state’, and the ‘Temporary order of control over movement of individuals through the 
frontline in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’. Some enterprises under Ukrainian jurisdiction 
managed to operate in the uncontrolled territories until 15 March 2017 (whereupon they were 
terminated by the Decree of the President of Ukraine N62/2017 ‘On urgent additional 
measures against hybrid threats to the national security of Ukraine’). 
Since 2014, Ukraine has clearly tended to reduce its economic dependence on Russia and the 
uncontrolled Donbas. As part of the trade war, Russia and Ukraine imposed mutual sanctions. 
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The loss of Russian markets and supplies led to deep production cuts in Ukrainian machine-
building and metallurgy, shifting Ukraine’s economy towards raw materials and agriculture. 
Following the economic and transport blockade of the uncontrolled Donbas and the breaking 
of ties with Russia, Ukraine suffered economic decline of 6.6% GDP in 2014 and 9.8% in 
2015. Moderate economic growth of 1-2% in 2016 and 2017 could not compensate for the 
drop in production and exports25. The National Bank of Ukraine estimated that direct losses 
from the economic blockade of Donbas cost the Ukrainian economy about USD 1.8-2.0 
billion in 2017 and ab ut USD 0.5 billion in 201826. The Ukrainian government and 
independent experts have assessed the total losses from the undeclared war with Russia 
between 2014 and 2017 at USD 80-100 billion (Åslund 2018). 
Ultimately, the tendency towards complete localisation of the conflict in Donbas was 
strengthened by the Law of Ukraine N7163 of 18 January 2018. The law identifies Russia as a 
country 
which initiated, organized and supported terroristic activity in Ukraine, and it is 
responsible for occupation of separate regions/parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts 
and military aggression against Ukraine using regular armed forces, and other, 
irregular troops and instructors as well as through employment of managed, controlled 
and funded armed groups, irregular troops and bands. 
The law also clarifies the status of local administrations in Donetsk and Luhansk as ‘Russian 
occupation administrations’. According to this law, Russia as an occupying state shall bear all 
responsibility for infrastructure as well as social protection and humanitarian assistance for 
25 See Ukraine GDP, 2018, available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp, accessed 13 May 2018.
26 ‘V NBU podschitali, skol’ko poteryala Ukraina iz-za blokady na Donbasse’, Segodnya, 11 December 2017, 
available at: https://www.segodnya.ua/economics/enews/v-nbu-podschitali-skolko-poteryala-ukraina-iz-za-
blokady-na-donbasse-1097607.html, accessed 13 May 2018.
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the population. In a lawsuit against Russia that Kyiv brought before the International Court of 
Justice, Kyiv acknowledged Russia’s effective control over Donetsk and Luhansk. 
Kyiv’s policy of formal and informal exclusion of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea, 
implemented since 2014, is a tactical element aimed at strengthening the state and 
consolidating power. Ukrainian expert Andrey Ermolaev explained the rationale behind these 
tactics: ‘Taking into account the unbalanced interests of the Ukrainian elites, an attempt to 
create a small but strong nation-state with a minimum of competitors for the historical past, 
but on a smaller territory, is an acceptable concept in Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan state 
building – the so-called Small Ukraine concept’ (Stremidlovskii 2017). These tactics have 
important implications, above all for the national security of Ukraine. Crimea’s and Donbas’ 
utility as leverage that Russia can use to destabilise Ukraine has significantly decreased due to 
Kyiv’s policy of complete isolation and minimisation of their influence on political and 
socioeconomic life in Ukraine. 
Unsurprisingly, the so-called People’s Republics have self-excluded themselves, following 
the same logic of the consolidation. Externally appointed governments in Donetsk and 
Luhansk are forced to compete with Kyiv and former local Ukrainian elites for political 
power, economic resources, and legitimacy. As part of their entrenchment policy in the 
occupied territories, the DPR and LPR resist Ukraine’s leverage and cut the linkages between 
self-declared republics and government-controlled territories.
The impossibility of DPR and LPR’s immediate reintegration into Ukraine in 2014-2015 
obliged the leaders of self-declared republics (and informally, Russia) to take responsibility 
for maintaining order in the occupied territories and the functioning of socioeconomic 
infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk, including the requisite concrete steps towards 
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institution-building (there were no institution-building efforts or support for social 
infrastructure and social payments until May 2015). The initial institution-building efforts 
were focused on creating security institutions like police and border protection, and 
establishing a central command for previously disintegrated armed troops, to whom 
paramilitaries were subsequently to be subordinated (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2016). In 
spring of 2015, when centralised payment of pensions and public-sector salaries began, the 
governments of the DPR and LPR created a republican banking systems (the National Bank 
of Ukraine had terminated financial operations with the uncontrolled territories in summer 
2014) and established bodies to collect taxes from local businesses.
Nevertheless, the priority of war against Ukraine over socio-economic affairs has been 
obvious ever since the formal declaration of DPR and LPR independence in April 2014. As 
one of our expert interlocutors suggested: ‘The republics were created for war, not for civilian 
life’ (Interview 12). To support ongoing armed conflict, Donetsk and Luhansk need to build 
military might by mobilising civilian men and women in armed forces and securing funding 
and supply or production of weapons. 
The lack of open-source, objective information from the uncontrolled territories limits any 
assessment of the military potential of DPR and LPR. From 2016 to 2018, the armed forces of 
the self-declared DPR and LPR were mostly composed of Ukrainian citizens (about 35,000 
troops). According to the Military Balance, at least 300 Russian troops are confirmed to have 
participated, including Russian mercenaries in command positions (International Institute of 
Strategic Studies 2017). Ukrainian troops number about 52,000 on the first line of defence 
and about 120,000 on the second and third lines (Interview 15).
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The types and features of military equipment used by the DPR and LPR (according to 
Ukrainian Defence Review data, the DPR and LPR have at their disposal about 600 tanks, 
1,300 troop carriers, 860 different artillery, and 300 multiple rocket systems) are equivalent to 
the military equipment used by the Ukrainian army (Ukrainian Defence Review 2013). 
However, one Ukrainian military expert suggested, ‘The military potential of DPR and LPR is 
sufficient to defend the borders of the occupied territories during a low-intensity operation. 
But the armies of the DPR and LPR cannot protect them if the Ukrainian command launches a 
full-fledged military campaign – the so-called Croatian scenario’ (Interview 15). Meanwhile, 
the commander of Ukrainian military headquarters estimated that the Ukrainian Army would 
potentially lose 10-12,000 troops in two weeks of such a military campaign27. On the other 
hand, the Russian experts we interviewed emphasised the high likelihood of open invasion as 
Russia’s answer in the Croatian scenario (Interviews 3, 16). 
According to the data of the Ukrainian Defence Review, Donetsk and Luhansk have never 
specialised in military production; still, a few modern military factories and several ‘double 
usage’ factories are able to produce both civilian goods and the military equipment for the 
DPR and LPR armies in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These 
factories are Topaz, which has the capacity to produce contemporary radar systems; the 
Donetsk State Factory of Rubber Technical Products, which makes a wide spectrum of 
explosives; Luhansk Cartridge, a producer of live bullets; and ‘double usage’ factories such as 
Tochmash, a maker of machines and equipment; Stirol – formerly one of the biggest chemical 
producers in Europe; the Luhansk Carriage-Building Factory, and others. In addition, three 
major railroad hubs (Debaltsevo, Yasinovata, and Ilovaisk) and a dense network of railroads 
27 ‘Muzhenko ozvuchil masshtabnye poteri VSU v sluchae silovogo stsenariya na Donbasse’, 24 Kanal, 5 
October 2017, available at: 
https://24tv.ua/ru/muzhenko_ozvuchil_masshtabnye_poteri_vsu_v_sluchae_silovogo_scenarija_na_donbasse_n8
73152, accessed 25 March 2018.
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connect the self-declared republics to Russia and have been used to supply arms and other 
goods and resources from and to Russia. Despite the destruction of its ground-based facilities, 
the Donetsk airport is still able to serve transport and military aircraft. The research-military 
infrastructure of the self-declared republics consists of Donetsk National Technical University 
(among Ukraine’s top universities in 2013), and 18 research institutes specialising in artificial 
intelligence, among other fields. In 2015 and 2016, new command and defence colleges and 
police academies were established in Donetsk and Luhansk. 
But if economic potential is the key to being able to make war, are the self-declared republics’ 
economies sufficient to maintain the ongoing low-intensity conflict against Ukraine? The war, 
their non-recognised status, and their broken ties with Ukraine-controlled territories have had 
a massive impact on socioeconomic affairs in Donetsk and Luhansk, creating a situation in 
which the population’s main sources of income are labour migration, pensions, salaries, and 
other subsidies (largely paid by Russia) for socially vulnerable groups, army, police, local 
authorities, and a wide range of public employees in the education, health care, cultural, and 
municipal infrastructure sectors (Interview 10). The structure of the region’s economy 
changed in response to the dramatic shocks caused by severance of economic and trade 
relations between traditional partners and the loss of both markets in Ukraine and traditional 
supply channels. 
The DPR’s Institute for Economic Study reported in 2017 that the economy was structured 
around metallurgy (37%), production of electricity (26%), food industry (11%), chemistry 
(9%), coal mining (8%), and machine building (2%) after suffering economic declines of 
19.9% in 2014 and 47.5% in 2015. At the same time, previously industrially developed 
territories of  Donbas were shifting to greater production in agricultural industries 
(agricultural production volumes increased threefold between 2014 and 2016) and foodstuffs 
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(production of foods rose several times over – e.g. tomato production rose by a factor of 11 
while milk production tripled). The main markets for these agricultural and food products are 
located in Russia (Institute for Economic Study 2017). Local experts estimate that 20-30% of 
industrial enterprises located in rebel-controlled territories will easily be able to adapt to the 
new conditions and 50-60% will find their place in the markets after some restructuring. The 
other 20% cannot adopt and should be closed. Deeper integration with Russia is the only path 
to economic survival (Interview 10, 11).
Insofar as the shift towards production for military purposes changes the economic structure 
of the uncontrolled territories, deepening militarisation affects society in Donetsk and 
Luhansk. It is especially visible in compulsory programmes of military education in 
secondary schools and universities, mandatory conscription, and military training for the 
populace. Moreover, the intensity of propaganda and the culture of war, spread via the media, 
has gotten ever stronger. The high share of the population employed in the army, police, and 
public service in Donetsk and Luhansk deepens society’s engagement in the life of the self-
declared republics through family ties and neighbourhood networks. 
The question of citizenship is critical to the entrenchment of the self-declared republics and 
the strength of their external and internal legitimacy. Outside of the illegal referendum on 
independence in May 2014 and illegal elections in November 2014, residents of Donetsk and 
Luhansk have not been presented with citizenship options since 1991. Formally, residents of 
the rebel-controlled territories are citizens of Ukraine; however, republican authorities also 
consider them ‘citizens’ of the DPR or LPR28. Since 2014, Russia has recognized some 
28 For example, a so-called Declaration of Citizenship adopted by the ‘parliament’ of the self-declared Luhansk 
People’s Republic considers all citizens of Ukraine who were formally registered in the rebel-controlled 
territories on the date of the Referendum on the Independence of the LPR to be ‘citizens’ of the LPR.
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documents issued by authorities of self-declared republics, but holders of DPR/LPR passports 
cannot undertake crucial legal procedures concerning migration, property rights, financial 
operations, and civic status. 
According to Ukrainian official statistics, about 1.5 million residents of the uncontrolled 
territories have applied for the status of internally displaced person (IDP) in Ukraine29. 
Official statistics of the State Border Guard of Ukraine put the daily number of civilians 
crossing the border between the rebel- and government-controlled territories at 30-35,00030. 
The mere fact that more than 50% of registered residents have moved from the self-declared 
republics to Ukraine-controlled territory raises the question of the internal legitimacy of, and 
public support for, the separatist r publics.
In 2017/18, the leadership of the self-declared republics redoubled their previous efforts to 
‘root’ the population in the territory they control by obstructing travel to Ukraine-controlled 
territory. By way of illustration, on 15 December 2017 the DPR’s then head, Aleksander 
Zakharchenko, signed a decree forbidding travel to Ukraine by certain population groups: 
‘public servants’, employees of organisations funded by the republican budget (education, 
health, culture, local administration, public transport, etc.), and employees of the occupied 
industrial enterprises.31 The self-declared republics experienced the ‘freezing’ of conflict with 
29 ‘V Minsotspolitiki nazvali kolichestvo pereselentsev’, Finance.ua, 8 January .2019, available at: 
https://news.finance.ua/ru/news/-/441712/v-minsotspolitiki-nazvali-kolichestvo-pereselentsev, accessed 25 
January 2019.
30 ‘Liniya razgranicheniya: Za 11 mesyatsev v «L-DNR» v"ezzhali bol'she, chem vyezzhali (Infografika)’, 
Donetskie Novosti, 10 December 2018, available at: https://dnews.dn.ua/news/698394, accessed 25 January 
2019.
31 ‘Gossluzhashchim vremenno zapreshchen vyezd na territoriyu Ukrainy’, 2017, available at: https://dnr-
online.ru/gossluzhashhim-vremenno-zapreshhen-vyezd-na-territoriyu-ukrainy/, accessed 25 January 2019.
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Kyiv as a step towards higher stability and predictability for institutions, the economy, and 
citizens. The ongoing armed conflict and entrenchment of the DPR and LPR in Donetsk and 
Luhansk, in addition to broken economic ties, limited mobility, and proliferation of 
propaganda, will inevitably increase the difficulty of any future reintegration with Ukraine. 
Towards confrontation with Russia
The domestic logic of ‘no peace, no war’ has consequences beyond the local level of the 
conflict, as it locks Russia and the West into a similar ‘winner takes all’ situation. With each 
side competing for influence in Ukraine and fearing that any concession or compromise 
equates to a ‘loss’ for itself and an equivalent ‘gain’ for the respective opponent, the current 
status quo is each side’s second-best and currently sole achievable outcome. Consolidation of 
the status quo in the Donbas province of Ukraine will likely lead to activation of other 
leverage in the competition and confrontation between Kyiv and Moscow as well as Russia 
and the West, in Ukraine and other parts of the world.
 
The frozen conflict in Donbas, along with decreased dependence on Russia (despite the 
consequent short-term economic losses), gives Ukraine a chance to strengthen its democratic 
institutions and cooperate more closely with the EU and NATO. However, this prospect holds 
some risks. In the worst-case scenario, protracted political instability and latent tensions 
combined with ever stronger authoritarianism and corruption, set against economic decline, 
curtailment of human rights and freedoms, and massive human flight from the country, will 
likely facilitate the processes of Ukraine’s marginalisation and heighten Russia’s geopolitical 
aspirations with respect to Ukrainian territory.
Conclusion
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We seek to make an original contribution by dispelling the notion that the war in Ukraine is a 
lagged war between Ukrainians and Russians resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Rather, we show that the post-Soviet settlement that decided the balance between political and 
economic power in Kyiv and Donetsk kept the Ukrainian state weak, if not failed, while also 
maintaining a peace dividend that was shaken first by the Orange Revolution and then, ten 
years later, in the Euromaidan protests. We have argued in previous publications (Malyarenko 
& Galbreath 2013; 2016) that the weak state and poor centre-periphery relations contributed 
substantially to the increased potential for conflict. Here, though, we suggest that core 
structural principles increased the probability of conflict, leading many to claim it is either a 
civilisational conflict or a proxy war between the West and Russia. 
Furthermore, the findings detailed here with reference to Schmidt and Kochan (1972) are 
significant because they clarify the when, how and why questions that elude other analyses of 
the conflict in Ukraine. Using organisational theory, we show how goal incompatibility and 
perceptions of interference play an important role in setting the scene for conflict potential. 
Importantly, this finding suggests that whereas the conditions for conflict can be exacerbated 
by Russia’s actions and increasing reactions to the West, the prospect of peace relies firmly 
on the core challenges of improving the state’s capacities and centre-periphery relations. This 
means that even if Russia continues to withdraw material aid to the separatists in Donbas, 
conflict potential remains. This finding holds significance for the future of the Minsk II 
agreement and the prospect of peace in Ukraine going forward.
Finally, our research relied on a rigorous investigation of the conditions for conflict potential 
in Ukraine. Using data from extensive interviews, government documents in Ukrainian and 
Russian, and fieldwork in the Donbas region, we sought to present a more complex picture of 
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the conflict that more clearly explains the war in Eastern Ukraine. This work incorporated the 
challenges of language differences and fieldwork in sensitive areas with sensitive sources. 
The war itself doggedly persists. The line of contact remains hot; both sides suffer regular 
casualties. Ukraine continues to receive material aid from the West while Russia continues to 
send material aid to the ‘people’s republics’. The result is an uncomfortable status quo 
regarding the Donbas and arguably Crimea. Here we have shown that going forward, the 
prospect for peace must include pathways to sustainable development and growth in state 
capacity for the benefit of all, as well as a new peace dividend for Ukraine’s oligarchs. 
Overcoming these contradictions will be key to reduced conflict potential going forward.
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Appendix. List of interviews
Anonymised interlocutor Reference
Academic, Kharkiv Karazin National University, Kharkiv, Ukraine Interview 1
Advisor, Russian Council on International Affairs, Moscow, Russia 
(via e-mail)
Interview 2
Academic, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia (via 
e-mail)
Interview 3
Expert, Carnegie Moscow Centre, Moscow, Russia (via Skype) Interview 4
Former Ukrainian MP, Kyiv, Ukraine Interview 5
Former public servant, Crimea, Ukraine Interview 6
Colonel (ret.) Ukrainian Armed Forces, Kyiv Interview 7
Businessman, Donetsk, Ukraine Interview 8
Businessman, Mariupol, Ukraine Interview 9
Businessman, former deputy of local council, IDP from Donetsk Interview 10
Businessman, ex-member of pro-governmental paramilitary battalion 
‘Dnepr’, IDP from Donetsk
Interview 11
Businessman, IDP from Donetsk, Kyiv, Ukraine Interview 12
Human rights activist, Kramatorsk, Ukraine Interview 13
Journalist, Kyiv, Ukraine Interview 14
Major General (ret.) Ukrainian Armed Forces, Kyiv, Ukraine Interview 15
Academic, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 
Moscow, Russia (via Skype)
Interview 16
Ukrainian MP, Kyiv, Ukraine Interview 17
Journalist, Kramatorsk, Ukraine Interview 18
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